# 1 — Taiwan DA/CP

## Format

Assume the 1AC, 1NC, and 2AC below. Students should prepare a neg block speech extending the Deterrence DA and the Strategic Clarity CP. The neg speech is five minutes.

## 1AC

### 1AC — Plan

#### The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

### 1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)

#### Contention One: Nuclear War

#### First, China is hardening its position on Taiwan. This risks a major crisis.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again.

In the past few years, it has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture United States-China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis.

Taiwan's status has been a highly sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing ever since 1949, when defeated nationalists withdrew to the island as the communists swept to power in the mainland. The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country.

Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify.

In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America.

These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo.

After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he stepped back from his predecessors' challenge to the status quo, and instead sought to build relations with Beijing, especially by encouraging commercial ties, which have led to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming deeply intertwined economically.

And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification, perhaps under the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing applies to Hong Kong.

But that hope received a severe blow just a year ago, when Mr Ma's plans for closer economic links with the mainland sparked massive "Sunflower" demonstrations in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead inexorably to precisely the political reunification that Beijing so clearly wants and expects. Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations suffered further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections.

It is now widely expected that when Mr Ma's term as president ends next year, he will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing. While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, the new leader will almost certainly be more assertive than Mr Ma has been.

That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority.

China's new leadership under President Xi Jinping seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening.

#### Second, political pressure in China will continue to grow — the CCP will be forced to act aggressively toward Taiwan.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

A common counterpoint to the argument above is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “[P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the United States from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses.”67

#### Third, tensions are already rising because Taiwan’s new government refuses to accept the ‘92 consensus.

Reuters 16 — Reuters, 2016 (“China says has stopped communication mechanism with Taiwan,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 26th, Available Online at <http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-says-has-stopped-communication-mechanism-with-taiwan-20160626-gps230.html>, Accessed 06-29-2016)

The Chinese government said on Saturday it had stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the self-ruled island's new government to recognise the "one China" principle, in the latest show of tension between the two.

China, which regards Taiwan as wayward province, is deeply suspicious of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, who took office last month, as they suspect she will push for formal independence.

Tsai, who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, says she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace.

But China has insisted she recognise something called the "1992 consensus" reached between China's Communists and Taiwan's then-ruling Nationalists, under which both agreed there is only one China, with each having their own interpretation of what that means.

In a brief statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said that since May 20, when Tsai took office, Taiwan has not affirmed this consensus.

"Because the Taiwan side has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus, this joint political basis for showing the one China principle, the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped," spokesman An Fengshan said.

#### Fourth, any crisis over Taiwan will escalate quickly — nuclear war is likely.

Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” *The Diplomat*, August 11th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/>, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Possible Scenario

While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.

If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation.

In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.

It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.

In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.

China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.

Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.

Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons.

Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.

China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.

Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan.

China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.

#### Fifth, any U.S. attempt to protect Taiwan will escalate to full-scale nuclear war.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Even more worryingly, this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself — far worse than reunification, in fact.

#### Sixth, tensions over Taiwan are the root cause of other regional tensions. A grand bargain would eliminate the most likely scenarios for major war.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)

Reevaluating The U.S. Commitment To Taiwan

China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the United States. If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the United States could find itself engaged in a new cold war. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The United States is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the United States. Consequently, the United States should consider ending this commitment. Doing so would have both benefits and costs.

Benefits. Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would have three main benefits. First, it would reduce the probability of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the United States’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means. Second, U.S. support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations. Third, terminating this commitment could also greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China. Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The United States has devised a concept, widely known as AirSea Battle, to counter China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. Ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the United States into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate U.S.-China competition.

#### Finally, U.S.-China war immediately kills millions — and the fallout would destroy the planet.

Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” *Huntington News*, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon.

The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.”

But need this lead to nuclear war?

Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.

Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might?

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

### 1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

#### Contention Two: U.S.-China Relations

#### First, U.S.-China relations have reached a dangerous tipping point — overcoming mutual hostility is vital.

Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“China and the United States: A Conversation with David M. Lampton,” The Asia Foundation, July 29th, Available Online at <http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/>, Accessed 06-29-2016)

*You have publicly warned that the U.S.-China relationship is at a critical “tipping point.” From your perspective as a longtime China watcher, what do you think about the future trajectory of bilateral relations?*

I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer to it than I’d like to be.

For the 40-plus years since Nixon went to China, and certainly since Deng Xiaoping came back to power in 1977, most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs, to be sure. 1989 raised questions. But Deng Xiaoping and George H. W. Bush got ties modestly back on track. China was opening up, investing in the world. Most Americans saw China as moving in the right direction. Conversely, most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction in terms of policy towards China.

Somewhere around 2008 to 2010, each side began to wonder about the direction of the other. With the rise of South China Sea problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. It seemed that China was successful but at the same time was going the wrong way in terms of foreign and domestic policy. I think most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election coming up is going to give voice to that.

In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place.

We’re moving from a relationship that was trying to find partnership to one now of deterrence. And threats are a key part of that. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the South China Sea. China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with the Pivot announcement in 2011, rotating troops – small forces – through Australia, and tightening up our alliance structure with Japan, all that creates anxiety in Beijing. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”

#### Second, the plan is *the only way* to reverse this trend — resolving Taiwan overcomes every other impediment to strong relations.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China's National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. … I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.

#### Third, crossing the tipping point increases the risk of war and undermines cooperation. Relations *aren’t* resilient without the plan.

Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” *U.S.-China Perception Monitor*, May 11th, Available Online at  [http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/](http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/), Accessed 06-29-2016)

For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But, none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments in both our nations that we each had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains.

Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives in either society to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” as one respected Chinese professor put it, and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After the 9/11 attacks on America, China was seen as non-threatening, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.”

In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization.

We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability.

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1]

Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative narratives have grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans.

What is happening? If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished. What can be done?

Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the United States should not be dirty words. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side.

#### Finally, U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address all global challenges.

Cohen et al. 9 — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” *Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China*, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation.

### 1AC — Solvency

#### Contention Three: Solvency

#### First, the plan removes the biggest potential flashpoint for U.S.-Sino nuclear conflict. This creates sustainable peace and strong U.S.-Sino relations — containment strategies are counterproductive.

Glaser 11 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

Accommodation On Taiwan?

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China — whatever they might formally agree to — have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea.

A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them.

Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

Given such risks, the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move argue that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong, however, because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.

#### Second, a *quid-pro-quo* grand bargain is key — it maintains U.S. resolve.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.

## 1NC

### 1NC — Strategic Clarity CP

#### Next off is the Strategic Clarity Counterplan.

#### The United States federal government should openly clarify that it would defend Taiwan against unprovoked Chinese aggression and reinforce its military capability to defend Taiwan.

#### The counterplan deters China from acting aggressively toward Taiwan — U.S. strategic ambiguity is the only reason they might miscalculate and invade.

Colby and Slocombe 16 — Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, formerly served as a Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as an Expert Advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, as a staff member on the President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding WMD, with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and with the State Department, recipient of the Exceptional Public Service Award from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the Department of State, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, and Walter Slocombe, Senior Counsel at Caplin & Drysdale—a law firm, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former Senior Advisor for National Defense in the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq, former Member of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2016 (“U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 23rd, Available Online at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense? It is hard to know because the U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” concerning how it would respond. It’s time for that to change.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states only that the U.S. would regard such an attack as of “grave concern,” and only commits the U.S. to maintaining the ability to defend the island. This is a much less firm commitment than the U.S. offers in NATO and to allies Japan and South Korea. But the U.S. stakes in defending a democratic Taiwan and maintaining the credibility of the overall U.S. alliance structure are no less significant.

The benefits of this approach long outweighed its risks. It preserved flexibility, was less offensive to Beijing and signaled to Taipei the need to tread gingerly on sovereignty issues. Beijing meanwhile appeared content to try honey rather than vinegar in coaxing Taiwan toward unification.

Moreover, China lacked the military capabilities to subjugate Taiwan. The U.S. was so dominant militarily that Beijing’s only plausible course was to tolerate the status quo.

But this calculus no longer obtains. The military balance is shifting in Beijing’s favor. Sources as diverse as Taiwan’s government and the RAND Corporation have publicly judged that within a few short years any U.S. defense of the island will be extremely demanding. Blocking a Chinese assault will still be possible for the U.S., but it will be harder, riskier and more costly than before.

This means that the situation is changing from one in which Beijing would have been foolhardy to attack Taiwan to one in which it may seem an increasingly viable option. Beijing may even deem it necessary to keep alive its ambition of uniting the island with the mainland.

Polls show that Taiwan’s residents overwhelmingly prefer the status quo or independence, and fewer identify as Chinese as time goes on. Given that there are already substantial economic links with the mainland, why should Beijing expect support for unification to grow suddenly, particularly in light of China’s turn away from liberalization under Xi Jinping and the discouraging example of Hong Kong?

Thus, sooner or later, China may decide that Taiwan is very unlikely to simply fall into its lap—and will be increasingly tempted to turn to coercion.

This emerging situation is particularly dangerous because ambiguity can heighten the likelihood of war when military strength becomes more evenly balanced. History is replete with examples of countries starting wars, even against much stronger powers, based on the belief that their strength or resolve over some issue was greater than that of their foes, and that their opponents wouldn’t fight at all or hard enough. Thus Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea in 1950, with Soviet and Chinese support, believing the U.S. wouldn’t come to the South’s defense.

Beijing could make a similar miscalculation about U.S. resolve over Taiwan. It might well assess U.S. ambiguity as indicating that, confronted with a tough and costly fight over Taiwan, the U.S. would decide not to go to war or not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals.

This perilous situation will only grow worse as China gets stronger. For the sake of deterrence and stability, it is essential that Beijing understand that using force would mean a stout U.S. intervention.

To contribute to this deterrent, the U.S. should pursue two paths. First, it should reinforce its military capability to defend Taiwan, impose costs on China and lessen the costs and risks to itself of doing so.

Second, Washington should bolster the credibility of its “no use of force” policy by making clearer the conditions under which it would fight. In particular, it should openly and forthrightly specify that the U.S. would defend Taiwan against unprovoked Chinese aggression. Clarifying these circumstances would reduce the risk that Beijing would think it can assault Taiwan without triggering a serious U.S. defense of the island.

Washington should also press Taipei to upgrade its own defenses and to avoid actions that could justifiably be seen as unreasonable. The most prominent element of this must be political restraint and coordination with Washington by Taipei.

At the same time, it is unreasonable for the people of Taiwan to expect Americans to be more vigorous in their defense than they are. As annual Chinese defense spending has ballooned in recent years, Taiwan’s has merely inched to $11 billion from $10 billion. Taiwan should commit to spending at least 2.5% of its GDP on defense (which is what South Korea spends in the face of a far less capable North Korea), up from about 2% today, and should shift its own defense investments from “shiny objects” like F-16s toward capabilities more closely tied to repelling a Chinese attack, such as anti-ship and anti-air systems, mines and special forces.

Clarifying U.S. commitments to Taiwan would be uncomfortable, but continued ambiguity risks China thinking that the gains from starting a war are worth the candle, and America either balking at the moment of crisis or fighting a war it might very well have deterred. Clarity would be controversial but safer.

### 1NC — Deterrence DA

#### First off is the Deterrence DA.

#### First, the U.S. will maintain its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific *unless* it abandons Taiwan.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Many observers see America in permanent decline and China as the anointed regional hegemon, but both of these outcomes are highly uncertain. Although now in the trough of an unemployment and fiscal crisis, the United States will probably recover. Conversely, China faces serious limits to its bid for regional leadership. These include internal vulnerabilities such as an aging population, the potential for large-scale political turmoil caused by groups angry at the Chinese government, and the necessity of making huge and painful adjustments to the Chinese economy.

Externally, few states in Asia prefer Chinese to U.S. leadership. Unless China becomes overwhelmingly strong and American capabilities greatly diminish, security cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries in defense of widely-accepted norms of international behavior will be sufficient to check those Chinese aspirations that are illegitimate in that they forcibly intrude on other people’s vital interests.

One of these illegitimate aspirations is the notion that China cannot be a prosperous, secure great power without politically absorbing Taiwan, the last big piece of unfinished business from China’s “century of humiliation.” Abandoning Taiwan would, tragically, acquiesce to this notion. The threat of Taiwan independence is an unfortunate invention of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a fake threat. An autonomous Taiwan is not preventing massive increases in China’s prosperity and security. On the other hand, Beijing’s threat to militarily destroy the political system and political identity chosen by Taiwan’s people is real.

Abandoning Taiwan is completely at odds with the broad U.S. agenda for international affairs as well as with the specific policy of “re-balancing” toward Asia. Washington should consider cutting off its support to Taiwan only if the United States has decided to abdicate its leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region and pull its influence back to the Western Hemisphere.

#### Second, the plan increases the risk of nuclear war — it emboldens China, destroys the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and crushes U.S. hegemony in Asia.

Lee 11 — Shyu-Tu Lee, President of the North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, 2011 (“Disengaging From Taiwan,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)

According to Charles Glaser, the prospects for avoiding war between the United States and China are good ("Will China's Rise Lead to War?" March/April 2011). But by ignoring China's history and economic policy and other relevant factors, Glaser arrives at policy prescriptions that would increase the chance of a Chinese nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland.

Glaser misjudges Chinese motives. China's military modernization is not primarily motivated by insecurity, as he asserts. China is not threatened by the United States or any of its neighbors. It is advocating its model of governance—managed capitalism combined with one-party authoritarianism—as a more efficient alternative to a free-market economy and democracy. China's mission is to regain its place as the dominant superpower so that the country can cleanse itself of the humiliation it has experienced at the hands of the West.

The rise of China poses grave challenges to U.S. security. Beijing implements a mercantilist trade policy and artificially sets a low value on its currency to promote exports, thus creating a large U.S. trade deficit with China year after year. Its army has been modernizing at a rapid pace, developing anti-access, area-denial weapons and cyber- and space-warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, China wants to integrate Taiwan because its democracy threatens Beijing's autocratic and repressive rule. In addition, Beijing needs Taiwan as a military base from which to project power into the Indian and Pacific oceans.

To keep the peace, the United States must discard the culture of excessive deference to Beijing and implement policies to maintain U.S. military superiority, stanch the flow of U.S. wealth to China, steer China toward democratization, strengthen its alliances with Japan and South Korea, and engage China in an economic and strategic dialogue to promote fair trade and avoid misunderstandings.

To prevent a crisis from escalating to nuclear war, Glaser says that the United States should back away from its commitment to Taiwan. Such accommodation, he argues, would smooth the way for better relations with China in the decades to come. Yet if Taiwan were to fall, the United States would suffer a geostrategic disaster. The sea-lanes and airspace around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China could turn Japan and South Korea into vassal states. With the demise of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, the United States would be forced to retreat to Hawaii.

#### Third, this sparks global arms races and nuclear proliferation.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough comprehensive national power, and by crossing the nuclear threshold, states would have free rein to make irredentist or expansionist territorial claims on weaker states, a return to the scorpions-filled bottle pre–World War I, only this time the critters are bristling with nuclear weapons. Not only would this invite aggression by powerful states, it would create incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and thereby bury existing nonproliferation regimes, not to mention spark arms races all over the planet. If force is the only determinant of international politics, this is the only foreseeable outcome. Moreover, how much comprehensive power would a state assume is necessary in order to get away with aggression? How many nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation.

#### Finally, proliferation causes nuclear war — turns the case.

Utgoff 2 — Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and senior member of the National Security Council Staff, 2002 (“Proliferation, Missile Defence And American Ambitions,” *Survival*, Volume 44, Number 2, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

## 2AC

### 2AC — Strategic Clarity CP

#### 1. Permute: do both — this avoids the Deterrence DA link because the addition of the counterplan to the grand bargain clarifies U.S. resolve.

#### 2. The U.S. can’t effectively defend Taiwan and China knows it — deterrence fails.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

But the stark reality is that these days, there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing. Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions of the kind the US used against Russia recently are simply unthinkable. This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy and avoid reunification by preserving the status quo. But it understands that China's patience is not inexhaustible — eventually China wants to get Taiwan back. Taiwan also understands that it cannot stand up to the mainland by itself, but it hopes that by slowly expanding its international status and profile within the status quo — without seeking independence — it can build support among regional countries as well as from the US, which will help it resist Beijing's ambitions for eventual reunification. Alas, this seems an illusion. There is a real danger that the Taiwanese overestimate the international support they can rely on if Beijing decides to get tough. No one visiting Taipei can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. China is simply too important economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on Taiwan's behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually.

#### 3. The counterplan crushes U.S.-China relations and increases the risk of war over Taiwan.

Kastner 16 — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of *Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond* and Co-Editor of *Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China*, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” *International Security*, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)

For similar reasons, U.S. policymakers should be skeptical of calls to dramatically increase the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security or to more visibly incorporate Taiwan into rebalancing initiatives.104 Such moves would be viewed as inflammatory in Beijing and could generate renewed pessimism about long-term trends in the strait. Perhaps more fundamentally, a much stronger U.S. commitment to Taiwan would stoke increased tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. As alluded to earlier, a key component of China’s expected costs of a Taiwan Strait conflict—regardless of whether the United States intervened—is the damage such a conflict would likely inflict on the broader U.S.-China relationship. But if the U.S.-China relationship is in tatters to begin with, then Beijing has less to lose in a cross-strait war. In essence, policies that increase U.S. support for Taiwan at a cost of a much worse U.S.-China relationship risk being self-defeating, as the increased stability generated by slowing the cross-strait power shift is canceled out by decreasing expected costs of war for China.

#### 4. China won’t take the threat of the counterplan seriously — they think the U.S. will eventually back down.

Mearsheimer 14 — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, 2014 (“Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, March/April, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today.

In addition, geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage.

### 2AC — Deterrence DA

#### 1. No Alliance DA — other policies solve and the plan will push allies toward *the U.S.*, not China.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 3)

Reassuring U.S. Allies

Possibly the most frequently raised objection to the United States ending its commitment to Taiwan is that it would undermine the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to its East Asia allies. This concern is overstated. U.S. entry into a grand bargain with China would undoubtedly send political shockwaves throughout the Asia Pacific, but the United States could take a variety of actions to demonstrate the strength of its continuing commitments. For example, it could increase the capability of the forces it commits to the region and further deepen joint U.S.- Japan military planning and high-level discussions on the requirements for extended deterrence. In fact, the United States has already begun taking some of these measures.

U.S. alliances are likely to endure because its allies do not have options that are more appealing. Meanwhile, their need for security is likely to continue to grow as China rises. Any doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince them to work harder to strengthen their alliances with the United States, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China.

#### 2. Scenario is illogical—US will be sufficiently withdrawn to prevent escalation—there’s a massive timeframe differential in order to acquire nukes

#### 3. No change in security guarantee to japan—keeps alliance

#### 4. The plan gives China a status quo it can live with — removing the motivation for expansionism.

Kastner 16 — Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-College Park, Author of *Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond* and Co-Editor of *Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China*, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” *International Security*, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)

The analysis presented in this article has significant implications for U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, the potential dangers posed by a shifting cross-strait balance of power suggest that proposals calling for a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security carry with them significant risks. For instance, a U.S. decision to terminate arms sales to the island would almost certainly exacerbate changes in the cross-strait balance of power. Such an effect could occur both directly, by undercutting Taiwan’s access to advanced [End Page 90] weaponry, and indirectly, by signaling a reduced U.S. interest in Taiwan’s security (and hence reduced willingness to intervene in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait). This is not to say that a concept such as Charles Glaser’s grand bargain, where the United States would end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for the PRC peacefully settling other regional maritime disputes and accepting a U.S. role in the region,103 would necessarily contribute to instability in the Taiwan Strait. Rather, I have argued that the destabilizing effect of a shifting military balance is conditional on the evolution of other trends, particularly those that affect China’s expected costs of war and those that affect the degree to which Chinese policymakers are optimistic or pessimistic about where Taiwan is heading over the long term. Yet, because a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan would affect the cross-strait military balance, such a policy shift is risky and should occur only in the context of a broader understanding that significantly increases China’s stake in a stable status quo.

#### 5. No incentive of East Asian arms race and doesn’t lead to war

Sundstrom 15 **—** Ian Sundstrom, surface warfare officer and holds a master’s degree in war studies from King’s College in London, 2015, (“An East Asian Arms Race: Does it Even Matter,” The Diplomat, 1/16, Available online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Whatever the case may be, most observers treat the concept of an arms race in Asia as self-evidently negative. But is that truly the case? Must an arms race have negative consequences for regional security and stability? Historical evidence and logic say no. Arms races do not lead inevitably to conflict. There are two fundamental requirements before states enter into wars: capability and intent. The first comprises military forces, economic wherewithal, and demographic factors, among other components. It is the means of war, money and guns. The second is the desire to embark upon war. It consists of a grievance, opportunity, or other cause de guerre, and the belief that war is the only, or even just the best, option available to achieve the desired outcome. An arms race involves only the capability side of the equation. Looking at the historical record demonstrates that the relationship between arms races and eventual war is not cause and effect. The classic case is the Anglo-German naval buildup before the First World War. The two countries did indeed rapidly expand their navies, and in the end they did go to war, but there was no obvious intention for war between the two countries. Circumstances outside their control, separate from the arms race – a rigid alliance structure, sudden assassination, and widely-held belief in the social virtues of armed conflict – led Europe to war. Another interesting example is the interwar naval arms treaties involving the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Those countries actively limited their naval construction programs in the belief that naval armaments had been a factor in the rush to war in 1914 and correspondingly that preventing any change in the naval balance would relieve pressure. In the end, the treaties were broken by the Japanese because they were intent on imperial expansion and the three powers went to war. The final classic example is the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this case, a rapid arms buildup from the 1950s onward, spurred by such mistaken beliefs as the “Missile Gap” on the US side, did not result in war between the two states. As early as the 1960s, both sides had the ability to quite literally eliminate the other from the face of the Earth with their nuclear arsenals, but that did not change the situation. Neither side had any intention of engaging in either a nuclear or massive conventional war with the other. From these three examples it is clear that a simple argument that arms races lead to war is incorrect. The more interesting question when pondering arms races involves a potential adversary’s intentions. In the context of an East Asian arms race, what are Chinese intentions? If we look at the historical record it does not seem that China’s expanding military will necessarily be used for aggressive campaigns. China last went to war in 1979, fighting a brief conflict with Vietnam in response to that country’s invasion of Cambodia the year before. Before that, it fought a short border war with India in 1962 after repeated border clashes as it sought to consolidate its control over Tibet. Earlier, in 1950, China went to war against the United Nations on the side of North Korea after Douglas MacArthur led his troops all the way to the Yalu River. If you take Beijing’s point of view, its wars have been defensive, to protect its interests and allies against aggression. That is, of course, what every nation that has ever gone to war believes, but from the outside China’s historical record is not obviously aggressive. China does have a recent history of aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan and islands in the East and South China Seas, though. Taken at face value, this would indicate that expanded Chinese military capabilities will be used offensively. However, talk is cheap whereas war is not, and rhetoric is just as often used to mask intentions as display them. Aggressive public statements are an easy way to placate nationalist sentiment at home and apply diplomatic pressure abroad. I do not have any doubt that China desires both de facto and de jure control over Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the various islands and reefs of the South China Sea, but it is more likely that China will continue its current “salami-slicing” diplomatic tactics than it will use its expanding military to engage in campaigns to seize the islands. China currently has the capability to seize these territories (Taiwan possibly excepted), even if it couldn’t defend them against recapture, and so continued restraint speaks volumes to Chinese intent. While we fret about the PLA Navy’s newest frigate and latest stealth fighter, China will slowly use diplomatic maneuvering to achieve its ends well below the threshold of open war. Of course, intentions are slippery and can change drastically without warning. That is why military capability is so often discussed. You can count and analyze tanks with some degree of certainty that tomorrow they won’t suddenly become submarines. Capability, however, is not a substitute for intent and it does not do to study one without the other. Whether an arms race is occurring in Asia or not, it should be remembered that war is not caused by weapons, but by people. China’s defense spending continues to increase, and its neighbors’ budgets may follow suit, but this does not change anything fundamental about the region’s international relations. Keeping the capability/intent framework in mind allows you to see past the bluster about rising defense budgets and expanding capabilities and focus on what really matters: who wants what, and are they willing to fight for it.

#### 6. The plan doesn’t get rid of the *rest* of the U.S.’s China policy — it maintains credibility.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2-3)

A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy toward China. Unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of U.S. policy. When uncertain about a state’s motives and goals, a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies. In response to improvements in China’s forces, the United States should invest in maintaining the military capabilities [end page 2] necessary to protect its allies, to preserve those allies’ confidence in U.S. commitments, to deter crises and war, and to fight effectively if deterrence fails.

#### 7. The “recognize the U.S.’s security role” QPQ gets China to commit to the new status quo.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

A second component of a grand bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the United States' long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. There have been periods when China viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance relatively favorable. For example, in 1980 China's leader, Hua Guofeng, stated: “We appreciate Japan's efforts to strengthen its alliance with the United States.”103 Since then a variety of factors, including the decline of Soviet power and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance starting in the mid-1990s have reduced, if not eliminated, China's positive assessment.104 In recent years, some Chinese elites have begun expressing harshly negative views. For example, in 2014 the deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army described the U.S. alliance system as “an antiquated relic of the Cold War that should be replaced by an Asia-centric security architecture.”105 Although open to varying interpretations, President Xi Jinping's call for an Asian security order managed by Asian countries and his criticism of “alliances as unhelpful for the region's security” can be viewed as offering a vision of the future in which the United States no longer plays a security role in East Asia. Increasingly, there is support in China for the conclusion that “in Beijing's eyes, the U.S. led security architecture is outliving the usefulness it once provided by ensuring the regional stability necessary for China's development. Instead, China views the alliance system as increasingly incapable of providing lasting security and itself a potential source of threat.”106

Especially in light of Beijing's increasingly negative assessment, official recognition and acceptance of the United States' continuing alliance commitments would be a valuable signal (not cheap talk). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others and the Chinese leadership's willingness to accept domestic political costs to advance China's foreign policy. Such action would not guarantee stability in China's policy, but it would provide greater confidence that China was willing to accept a revised geopolitical status quo. Maybe more important, if China were unwilling (or unable) to provide this official acceptance, the United States would have to be more worried that China's leaders believe that its role in East Asia requires pushing the United States out of the region.

# 2 — Topicality No QPQs

### Format

Assume the plan, 1NC, and 2AC below. Students should prepare a neg block speech extending Topicality. The neg speech is four minutes.

### 1AC — Plan

#### The United States federal government should offer non-discriminatory and transparent CFIUS reviews of investment projects from China in exchange for China’s willingness to further narrow its “negative list” of sectors exempt from a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States. Should China agree, the United States should accede to the negotiated Bilateral Investment Treaty.

### 1NC — Topicality Can’t Be QPQ

#### Engagement must be unconditional—it’s *distinct* from conditional policies. QPQ plans are not topical.

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19

‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

#### Vote negative because the plan doesn’t meet the best definition of “engagement” — key to precise limits and predictable ground. Broad definitions *over-generalize*, undermining conceptual clarity.

#### *“Good”* isn’t good *enough* — *manageable* limits require an *enforceable* brightline. A strict definition of the topic mechanism is a prerequisite for *in-depth research* and *robust clash* over core issues.

### 2AC — Topicality Can’t Be QPQ

#### 1. The plan “builds close ties” with China — *we meet* Smith’s definition of “engagement”.

#### 2. Neg interp over-contextualized to *Europe* — not predictable for debating U.S. policy.

#### 3. Economic engagement can be conditional or unconditional — *counter-interpretation* most predictable.

Kahler and Kastner 6 — Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 43, Number 5, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 524-525)

Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations – is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international politics.

Economic Engagement: Strategies and Expectations

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional.1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic ‘carrots’, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional [end page 524] strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.

The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state’s influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target state’s behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (H1), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2

Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

#### 4. Prefer aff interpretation — intends to define “*economic engagement*” as a term of art, reflects overwhelming scholarly consensus, and contextualizes to U.S. policy.

#### 5. QPQs crucial aff ground — conditioning debates are inevitable. Better to give aff more ground than to give neg QPQ counterplans — too hard for aff to generate offense given 2AC time constraints, but neg has reactive ground and the block to develop depth.

#### 6. Functional limits prevent topic explosion — *solvency advocates* and *counterplans* constrain aff choice.

#### 7. Good is good enough—search for best definition *endless* and distracts from topic education. Debatability outweighs precision—*wrong forum* for pursuit of definitional perfection.

# 3 — Espionage DA

### Format

Assume the 1AC, 1NC, and 2AC below. Students should prepare a neg block speech extending the Esiponage DA. The neg speech is four minutes.

### 1AC — Plan + Advantages

#### The United States federal government should offer non-discriminatory and transparent CFIUS reviews of investment projects from China in exchange for China’s willingness to further narrow its “negative list” of sectors exempt from a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States. Should China agree, the United States should accede to the negotiated Bilateral Investment Treaty.

#### Advantages = Chinese Economic Growth (Diversionary War, CCP Collapse 🡪 War), U.S.-China Relations (Warming)

### 1NC — Espionage DA

#### Chinese espionage is coming now – they’re targeting microchip technology and semiconductors

Mozur and Perlez 16 – (Paul Mozur writes about technology from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau. His coverage areas include companies such as Foxconn, Huawei and Tencent and industry topics such as social media, censorship and China's electronics supply chain; Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent in the Beijing bureau of The New York Times. She covers China and its foreign policy, particularly relations between the United States and China, and their impact on the Asian region; 2/4/16, “Concern Grows in U.S. Over Chinas Drive to Make Chips,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/technology/concern-grows-in-us-over-chinas-drive-to-make-chips.html?_r=1>, Accessed 6/27/16, HWilson) \*\*\* cites Mark Newman, a Sanford C. Bernstein analyst, and Colin Humphreys, a British physicist at Cambridge University

Advancing its chip industry has been a major political initiative for Beijing. In recent years, analysts said, Chinese corporate espionage and hacking efforts have been aimed at stealing chip technology, while Chinese firms have used government funds to buy foreign companies and technology and attract engineers.

Last year, different subsidiaries of the state-controlled Tsinghua Holdings made a number of bids for American companies, including an unsuccessful S23 billion offer for the American memory chip maker Micron Technology and a $3.78 billion bid for a 15 percent stake in the hard-drive maker Western Digital, which was accepted.

Last year's spree of deal activity, and lack of American regulatory response, spurred a Sanford C. Bernstein analyst, Mark Newman, to say in a November report that the United States "runs the risk of being asleep at the wheel." He cited efforts by South Korea and Taiwan to prevent China from acquiring some technology assets.

The Lumileds block is being interpreted by the chip industry as the United States "waking up a bit to the threat," Mr. Newman said in an email. Gallium nitride is particularly sensitive. One military industry magazine called the material tire biggest tiring since silicon, which is now commonly used to make tire transistors in microchips. It cited Raytheon's use of tire material to make smaller, low-powered radar for American missile systems. "Many say it's tire the most important semiconductor material since silicon," said Colin Humphreys, a British physicist at Cambridge University.

He said that while it was not clear what tire United States government was worried about, research by LED companies into technology linking gallium nitride and silicon could have broader implications for creating advanced microchips that could be used in a wide array of electronics.

Tire would-be investor in Lumileds, GSR Ventures, also holds a stake in Lattice Power, a Chinese company that has been vocal about its efforts to develop technology related to gallium nitride and silicon.

In a November 2015 statement about a recent investigation into Chinese industrial espionage, Taiwan's Ministry of Justice also expressed worries about China aiming at tire material. Calling tire mass production of gallium nitride a "key development project" for China, tire ministry said it was concerned about tire theft of trade secrets from Taiwanese companies working on tire material and Chinese-led recruitment of engineers knowledgeable about it.

#### Increasing CFIUS transparency makes effective counter-espionage in the future impossible

Stanley 15 – (Mary Ellen Stanley, B.A., University of Richmond (2011); M.A., Baylor University (2013); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (Expected 2016); Editor-in-Chief, Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2015-2016); Fellow, Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law (2014-2016); 2015, “From China with Love: Espionage in the Age of Foreign Investment,” Published in *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, Vol.40, Issue 3, pgs 1033-1079; <http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1113&context=bjil>, Accessed 6/24/16, HWilson)

A. Maintaining a Permissive Definition of “National Security”

Contrary to the suggestions of recent scholarship and proposed legislation, the term “national security” must not be explicitly defined. Even though commentators suggest a need for a definition that expands CFIUS’s scope of power or increases the Committee’s transparency to foreign investors,240 providing a concrete definition inhibits CFIUS’s ability to adapt to new forms of industrial espionage. Such fixed definitions would likely overlook nuanced threats in the current era of globalization and compromise the nation’s security. In order to properly maintain national security within the United States, the definition of “national security” should not be concretely defined. Instead, “national security” should remain a broad term, in order to best grapple with unexpected issues. As seen in § 2170(f), ten of the eleven factors the Committee considers are explicitly focused on inquiries concerning national security.241

Additionally, the definition of “national security” must not be specifically defined to include “economic security” or a “net benefit” review.242 Including “economic security” as part of the national security inquiry would insert a political factor into CFIUS’s jurisdiction and thus politicize the review process. Although CFIUS, in both its structure and history, often appears to conflate national security with economic security, it is important to note that national and economic security are often tightly intertwined. This close relationship is proven by CFIUS’s intimate relationship with the Department of the Treasury and due to CFIUS’s jurisdiction hinging on the type of economic transaction.243 Although the economic security of the nation is critical, economic security should not eclipse the foundational concern of CFIUS—national security.244

If the substance of CFIUS national security inquiries were amended to include a “net benefit” review, as proposed in Congresswoman DeLauro’s legislation, the analysis would become even more politicized because subsequent evaluations would range into more politically-debated national issues. 245 Topics such as “economic activity,” “quality of employment,” the effect on productivity, “industrial efficiency,” and compatibility with “U.S. cultural policies” 246 would lead to drastic politicization of the review process. These issues would also divert CFIUS’s focus from its already burdensome task of protecting national security. Furthermore, a substantive expansion of the national security inquiry would not only discourage FDI, but would make the CFIUS judgments more arbitrary and politicized due to the critical lack of a framework for determining what constitutes a “net benefit.” Finally, as seen in the Chinese Model, which arguably violates China’s WTO commitments, adding such stipulations could possibly violate the United States’ commitments247 to the WTO.248

#### Successful tech espionage leads to Chinese military superiority

Mozur and Perlez 16 – (Paul Mozur writes about technology from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau. His coverage areas include companies such as Foxconn, Huawei and Tencent and industry topics such as social media, censorship and China's electronics supply chain; Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent in the Beijing bureau of The New York Times. She covers China and its foreign policy, particularly relations between the United States and China, and their impact on the Asian region; 2/4/16, “Concern Grows in U.S. Over Chinas Drive to Make Chips,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/technology/concern-grows-in-us-over-chinas-drive-to-make-chips.html?_r=1>, Accessed 6/27/16, HWilson) \*\*\* cites Mark Newman, a Sanford C. Bernstein analyst, and Colin Humphreys, a British physicist at Cambridge University

HONG KONG — China is spending billions of dollars on a major push to make its own microchips, an effort that could bolster its military capabilities as well as its homegrown technology industry.

Those ambitions are starting to be noticed in Washington.

Worries over China's chip ambitions were the main reason that United States officials blocked the proposed purchase for as much as S2.9 billion of a controlling stake in a unit of the Dutch electronics company Philips by Chinese investors, according to one expert and a second person involved with the deal discussions.

The rare blockage underscores growing concern in Washington about Chinese efforts to acquire the know-how to make the semiconductors that work as the brains of all lands of sophisticated electronics, including military applications like missile systems.

In the case of the Philips deal, the company said late last month that it would terminate a March 2015 agreement to sell a majority stake in its auto and light-emitting diode components business known as Lumileds to a group that included the Chinese investors GO Scale Capital and GSR Ventures. It cited concerns raised by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which reviews whether foreign investments in the country present a national security risk.

Philips said that despite efforts to alleviate concerns, the committee — known as Cfius — did not approve the transaction.

"There is a belief in the Cfius community that China has become innately hostile and that these aren't just business deals anymore," said James Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a research firm, who speaks to people connected with the committee's process.

Philips did not respond to requests for comment. GSR Ventures, which sponsors GO Scale Capital, declined to comment.

Cfius, an interagency body that includes representatives from the Treasury and Justice Departments, declined to comment and does not make its findings public.

Cfius reviews have been a growing problem for outbound Chinese deals. According to the most recent data available, in 2012 and 2013 Chinese investment accounted for more committee reviews than money coming from any other country. A 2008 Chinese effort to invest in the network equipment company 3Com was withdrawn while the committee was reviewing it.

Recently, the committee found acceptable a number of major Chinese deals, including a takeover of Smithfield Foods by Shuanghui International and Lenovo's takeover of IBM's low-end server unit. In 2012, President Obama ordered a Chinese company to stop building wind farms near an American military installation in Oregon after a negative Cfius review.

At the center of the committee's concerns on the Philips deal, according to Mr. Lewis, was a little known but increasingly important advanced semiconductor material called gallium nitride. Though not a household name like silicon, gallium nitride, often referred to by its abbreviation GaN, could be used to construct a new generation of powerful and versatile microchips.

It has been used for decades in the low-energy light sources known as light- emitting diodes, and it features in technology as mundane as Blu-ray Disc players. But its resistance to heat and radiation give it a number of military and space applications. Gallium nitride chips are being used in radar for antiballistic missiles and in an Air Force radar system, called Space Fence, that is used to track space debris.

"Gallium nitride makes better-performing semiconductors that were key in upgrading Patriot radar systems," said Mr. Lewis. "It's classic dual use, sensitive in that it could be used in other advanced weapons sensors and jamming systems."

#### Chinese military superiority causes Asian instability and regional proliferation – incites territorial grabs which escalate to US-China nuclear war

Colby 14 – (Elbridge Colby is the Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 12/19/14, “Welcome to China and America's Nuclear Nightmare,” *National Interest*, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-china-americas-nuclear-nightmare-11891?page=show>, Accessed 6/27/16, HWilson)

FOR ALL the focus on maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, there is an even greater peril in Asia that deserves attention. It is the rising salience of nuclear weapons in the region. China’s military buildup—in particular its growing capabilities to blunt America’s ability to project effective force in the western Pacific—is threatening to change the military balance in the area. This will lead to a cascade of strategic shifts that will make nuclear weapons more central in both American and Chinese national-security plans, while increasing the danger that other regional states will seek nuclear arsenals of their own. Like it or not, nuclear weapons in Asia are back.

For seventy years, the United States has militarily dominated maritime Asia. During this era, U.S. forces could, generally speaking, defeat any challenger in the waters of the western Pacific or in the skies over them. Washington established this preeminence and has retained it in the high-minded aspirations to foster the growth and development of prosperous, liberal societies within the region. Military primacy has been the crucial underwriter, the predicate of broader American strategy

This primacy is now coming into question. China’s advancing “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities as well as its expanding strike and power-projection capabilities will present a mounting challenge to the U.S. force posture in the Pacific region—and thus to America’s strategy for the Asia-Pacific as a whole. Beijing appears to be seeking to create a zone in the western Pacific within which the military power of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will be able to ensure that Chinese strategic interests are held paramount—in effect, to supplant the United States as the military primate in the region. The oft-cited DF-21D “carrier-killer” ballistic missile is only one small facet of this much broader Chinese effort, which encompasses the fielding of a whole network that integrates a range of increasingly high-quality platforms, weapons, sensors, and command, control and communications systems. Because of this effort, U.S. forces attempting to operate in maritime Asia will now have to struggle for dominance rather than simply assume it.

Indeed, anxiety about the relative military balance between the United States and China is building among the defense officials charged with monitoring it. As Frank Kendall, the Pentagon official with chief responsibility for developing and acquiring new military systems, wrote in a recent paper focused on the implications of China’s military buildup:

While the U.S. still has significant military advantages, U.S. superiority in some key warfare domains is at risk . . . U.S. Navy ships and western Pacific bases are vulnerable to missile strikes from missiles already in the inventory in China . . . The net impact is that China is developing a capability to push our operating areas farther from a potential fight, thereby reducing our offensive and defensive capacity . . . The Chinese are developing an integrated air defense system that puts U.S. air dominance in question, and in some regions, air superiority is challenged by 2020.

Kendall summarized his assessment with the judgment that

China is rapidly modernizing its forces and is developing and fielding strategically chosen capabilities that are designed to defeat power projection capabilities the U.S. depends upon. Technological superiority the U.S. demonstrated over 20 years ago, and which we have relied upon ever since, is being actively challenged.

Nor is Kendall an outlier in this assessment—rather, his view represents something like the evolving baseline understanding among defense officials and experts. Comparably informed and thoughtful defense leaders like Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work have said very similar things.

As a result, the United States is beginning to mount an effort to respond to China’s growing capabilities—for instance, through the Defense Department’s recently announced “Offset Strategy” initiative. The Pentagon rightly appears to be focused on maintaining American advantages in the effective projection of conventional military force even in the face of a resolute and highly capable opponent like Beijing. This goal stretches across procurement decisions, revisions to plans and doctrines, changes to deployment and basing, and attitudes toward the exploitation of technology. Outside commentators have tended to conflate this broad effort with the department’s laudable Air-Sea Battle initiative, which is clearly an important segment of the larger attempt to counter challenges to U.S. military superiority, but is still only a part of it. Ideally, this initiative will be successful and will allow the United States to maintain its traditional dominance in maritime Asia. But even if the Pentagon cannot wholly achieve this objective, maintaining even a partial edge in the military balance against China will give the United States valuable deterrent and coercive leverage in what will very likely be a fraught relationship with Beijing.

But achieving even this more modest aspiration is more a hope than a certainty. And the persistence of sequestration, the American political system’s unwillingness to decisively shift resources toward maintaining the military edge in Asia, and the abiding necessity or allure of involvement in other regions raise questions as to how reasonable this hope is. Thus, we cannot be sure how successful the United States will be in retaining its military edge in the region.

In fact, prudence suggests a more pessimistic assessment about the future balance between U.S. and Chinese military strength in the western Pacific. Such moderate pessimism stems not only from domestic political constraints, but also, more importantly, from the assessment that the Chinese economy, even if it slows further (as seems probable), is likely to keep growing significantly—along with the budget for the PLA, which has continued to grow at high levels even as China’s economy has already slowed. And as the Chinese economy continues to mature and advance, we may reasonably expect that the Chinese military will continue to become more technologically sophisticated, professional and capable of effectively conducting what the Chinese refer to as “warfare under informationized conditions”—that is, modern, high-tech war. This will inevitably put pressure on the enormous—and unusual—military advantages that the United States has enjoyed in recent decades.

Accordingly, the future military balance in the western Pacific will, at the very least, be far more even between the United States and China than was previously the case, and likely will become increasingly competitive. Over time, indeed, the balance may tip against the United States and its allies, at least in certain regions and with respect to particular contingencies about which we have traditionally cared. Take Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense stated in 2013 that the United States would not be able to block a Chinese invasion of the island by 2020. Of course, one might ascribe this judgment to special pleading on the part of Taipei—except that Taiwan’s is not an isolated assessment; many defense experts share this view. Nor should we expect a shift in the balance with respect to Taiwan to be the end of this trend. Rather, if the United States fails to maintain its edge over China, Beijing is likely to be able to attain practical military superiority in areas of maritime Asia other than Taiwan, and over the long term perhaps well beyond it.

SUCH A development would have profound strategic consequences. The United States has seen an open and friendly order in maritime Asia as crucial to its interests at least since Matthew Perry’s “Black Ships” opened Japan in the nineteenth century; since the Second World War, it’s seen its own military supremacy in the Pacific as the best way to secure and promote that order. If China can attain military dominance or even simply advantage in this area, the world’s most dynamic region, then U.S. interests as traditionally understood are likely to suffer, perhaps seriously. It will be Beijing rather than Washington that will serve as the ultimate arbiter of what is and is not acceptable in Asia. It is a reasonable assumption that such a power structure would be considerably less congenial to Washington’s interests—let alone those of U.S. allies—than the current order.

Assuming that the United States will not concede such regional hegemony to Beijing, that the United States and its allies will continue to have significant areas of tension and disagreement with an increasingly capable China, and that the United States will remain ready to use military force to defend or vindicate its and its allies’ interests in Asia, this means that the United States may come to blows with a power deploying military forces of roughly comparable and, in some circumstances, possibly superior effectiveness. In simpler terms, it means that the outcome of a conflict between the United States and China will be more uncertain and that, if current trends are not redressed, the United States might well ultimately find itself on the losing end of a major military engagement in the western Pacific.

This shift toward a more even military balance will lead to significant changes in the Asia-Pacific. It will likely make China more assertive, since Beijing will be more confident that resorting to military force could pay off for it in regional disputes it cares about, especially if a conflict can be kept relatively limited. This point should not be controversial: the notion that greater strength makes one more assertive and ambitious is well demonstrated, both in international politics and in everyday life. China’s rising assertiveness in its near seas in recent years has been fueled by the nation’s general sense of growing power as well as the expanding inventory of assets available to pursue its ambitions. For instance, China’s far more developed maritime and oil-drilling capabilities are playing a major role in Beijing’s increased pushiness in the South China Sea.

War is more likely in situations like this, when both sides think they can prevail, rather than when the prospective winner is clear. The great powers, for example, were more ready to fight in 1914 because each side believed it enjoyed a solid chance of victory. Conversely, a large amount of the stability and comity among the major powers of the post–Cold War world can be traced to a situation of “hegemonic stability”—the evident fact that no other power could venture beyond its own borders to challenge the United States in the years following the 1991 Gulf War. This more stable situation will no longer so clearly hold as resort to force in maritime Asia becomes a more reasonable option for Beijing.

A more even power balance is also likely to lead to a reordering of alignments and strategic postures in the region. Asian and Pacific states will continually judge the relative strength of the two titans of the Asia-Pacific, their resolve and their future trajectories, and adjust their own policies and postures accordingly. Indeed, this is already happening. The old U.S. ally Thailand, for instance, has drifted away from Washington and moved closer to Beijing, while old U.S. adversary Vietnam, feeling the PRC’s pressure in the South China Sea, is warming up to Washington.

THESE FACTORS are becoming increasingly prevalent in discussions of the future of Sino-American relations and of the Asia-Pacific more generally. But one factor that has not been sufficiently appreciated is that the growth of China’s military power vis-à-vis the United States is also very likely to make nuclear weapons grow in salience in the region, and particularly in the Sino-American military balance. More concretely, nuclear weapons may come to loom larger—and perhaps much larger—than they have since the Cold War over U.S. and Chinese military planning, strategic calculations in capitals, and concerns over escalation and brinkmanship in the Asia-Pacific.

This is true for four reasons.

First, a war in the region between the United States and China under circumstances of even rough conventional parity will be more susceptible to nuclear escalation. In the past, most defense analysts and planners envisioned a Sino-American conflict in maritime Asia starting and remaining a conventional fight. Given the PLA’s very modest capabilities for such a contingency, the United States was seen as able to handle any Chinese attempts at power projection solely by relying on U.S. conventional forces and with relatively limited requirements for vertical or horizontal escalation.

In practical terms, the United States would have been able to defeat Chinese attacks on Taiwan or other such plausible beneficiaries of American defense with relatively limited means and on Washington’s terms. Nuclear weapons, if they were to become involved, were seen as most likely to be introduced in limited numbers by the Chinese in a desperate attempt to stave off defeat in a Taiwan contingency, a defeat that might jeopardize the legitimacy of the Communist regime. But the threat to resort to such usage was seen as of limited credibility and actual employment along these lines of minimal effectiveness in light of substantial American advantages in the quality and quantity of the conventional and nuclear forces it could use to conduct such a limited nuclear war.

But we will be moving into a world in which the basic assumptions that determined such assessments no longer hold. That is because future efforts to defeat Chinese attempts at power projection will not be so easily handled, especially without our needing to resort to vertical or horizontal escalation to prevail. In any contingency in the region, the growing sophistication of China’s large military will mean that the United States will have a much more difficult time overcoming it, since Chinese systems that have longer range, are more accurate, are smarter and are more effectively netted together require more work, creativity and skill to defeat. Put more directly, the United States and its allies will have to fight harder, quicker, nastier, deeper, for longer, with less deliberation and over a wider battlefield than was the case in the past in order to defeat Chinese forces in maritime Asia.

For example, in the past, the United States might have designated Chinese fixed ballistic missiles of limited range and accuracy based on or near the coast for attack by aircraft operating safely with excellent and secure information later in a campaign. In the future, however, the United States might have to designate Chinese mobile ballistic missiles of longer range and better accuracy based farther in the country’s interior for attack by aircraft operating perilously with limited information early in a conflict. So, for instance, if Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is right that China will have the upper hand in a battle over Taiwan by the 2020s—but the United States still wants to deter or defeat an attempted Chinese invasion of the island—the United States may well need to be willing to hit targets deeper in China than had been envisioned before, strike sooner and expand the war considerably beyond the island’s immediate environs in order to compel Beijing to back away from seizing Taiwan.

Even without anyone really wanting to introduce nuclear weapons into the equation, then, these trends raise classic “inadvertent escalation” risks. This line of analysis points to the dangers of escalation that can arise due to the way even a conventional war can unfold. In particular, if one needs to fight harder against an opponent in order to prevail, it also becomes harder to limit the war—including in ways that might entangle nuclear weapons. For instance, U.S. efforts in the event of conflict to strike at Chinese command-and-control nodes, missile bases and systems, surveillance and intelligence assets, and the like, even if intended only to affect the nonnuclear balance, might well implicate nuclear weapons. This might be because such assets or capabilities might be collocated with nuclear forces or themselves have dual nuclear and conventional roles, because the Chinese might fear such hard-hitting attacks are a prelude to decapitation, or because the Chinese might misread conventional strikes as nuclear attacks. In the fog of war, any number of such dynamics could push toward consideration of nuclear use.

### 2AC — Espionage DA

#### 1. Non-unique – Chinese economic espionage is high now and thousands of companies have been hit – also proves no link

Stahl 16 – (Lesley Rene Stahl is an American television journalist. She has spent most of her career with CBS News, having been affiliated with that network since 1972; since 1991, she has reported for CBS' 60 Minutes; the article cites interviews with her and John Carlin, assistant attorney general for National Security with responsibility for counterterrorism, cyberattacks and increasingly economic espionage, Daniel McGahn, the head of American Superconductor, and Dmitri Alperovitch and George Kurtz, cofounders of a computer security firm called CrowdStrike; 1/17/16, “The Great Brain Robbery,” *CBS News: 60 Minutes*, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-great-brain-robbery-china-cyber-espionage/>, Accessed 6/30/16, HWilson)

Economic espionage sponsored by the Chinese government is costing U.S. corporations hundreds of billions of dollars and more than two million jobs

If spying is the world's second oldest profession, the government of China has given it a new, modern-day twist, enlisting an army of spies not to steal military secrets but the trade secrets and intellectual property of American companies. It's being called "the great brain robbery of America."

The Justice Department says that the scale of China's corporate espionage is so vast it constitutes a national security emergency, with China targeting virtually every sector of the U.S. economy, and costing American companies hundreds of billions of dollars in losses -- and more than two million jobs.

John Carlin: They're targeting our private companies. And it's not a fair fight. A private company can't compete against the resources of the second largest economy in the world.

John Carlin is the assistant attorney general for National Security with responsibility for counterterrorism, cyberattacks and increasingly economic espionage.

John Carlin: This is a serious threat to our national security. I mean, our economy depends on the ability to innovate. And if there's a dedicated nation state who's using its intelligence apparatus to steal day in and day out what we're trying to develop, that poses a serious threat to our country.

Lesley Stahl: What is their ultimate goal, the Chinese government's ultimate goal?

John Carlin: They want to develop certain segments of industry and instead of trying to out-innovate, out-research, out-develop, they're choosing to do it through theft.

All you have to do, he says, is look at the economic plans published periodically by the Chinese Politburo. They are, according to this recent report by the technology research firm INVNT/IP, in effect, blueprints of what industries and what companies will be targeted for theft.

John Carlin: We see them put out the strategic plan, and then we see actions follow that plan. We see intrusion after intrusion on U.S. companies.

Lesley Stahl: Do you have a number of U.S. companies that have been hit?

John Carlin: It's thousands of actually companies have been hit.

Lesley Stahl: Thousands of U.S. companies?

John Carlin: Of U.S. companies.

#### 2. No link — plan doesn’t end CFIUS review — U.S. will still protect vital sectors.

#### 3. CFIUS doesn’t solve anything – it gets circumvented – their ev

Stanley 15 – (Mary Ellen Stanley, B.A., University of Richmond (2011); M.A., Baylor University (2013); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (Expected 2016); Editor-in-Chief, Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2015-2016); Fellow, Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law (2014-2016); 2015, “From China with Love: Espionage in the Age of Foreign Investment,” Published in *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, Vol.40, Issue 3, pgs 1033-1079; <http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1113&context=bjil>, Accessed 6/24/16, HWilson)

A foreign entity’s mere presence could have severe implications for national security. Thus, these additional transactions should be reviewed under the same standards as the more traditional covered transactions. Furthermore, these additional transactions allow canny investors to evade CFIUS review by restructuring transactions that would be covered under the current legislation into leases, construction, and additional investments, or into other nontraditional investments such as greenfield investments.257 Since the legislation does not have an “anti-circumvention clause” 258 or a focus on the substance of the transaction, as seen in the Chinese Model, foreign investors are able to use alternative investment structures to sidestep CFIUS reviews.259 Not requiring approvals of such alternative transactions sets a dangerous precedent for national security. As a result, the CFIUS review process must look beyond the form of a transaction and review both the substance of a transaction and its effects.

#### 4. The aff solves the impact – the only way to ensure that espionage is limited is increasing relations and co-operation – i.e. the plan

Gordon 15 – (Nicholas Gordon is a researcher at the Global Institute For Tomorrow in Hong Kong. He has an MPhil from Oxford in International Relations and a BA from Harvard. His writing has also appeared in The South China Morning Post, The Diplomat, China Daily and Caixin. A version of this review was originally published in the Asian Review of Books; 9/29/15, “Review: China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain,” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/review-china-and-cybersecurity-espionage-strategy-and-politics-in-the-digital-domain/>, Accessed 6/29/16, HWilson)

The agreement between the United States and China to limit cyberespionage of intellectual property for commercial gain, announced on September 25, caps a tense debate over Chinese activities in cyberspace. Over the past several months, American officials had routinely called high-profile breaches of American digital networks, such as the hacking of the Office of Personnel Management, state-sanctioned espionage. This fed a belief, held by both American and Chinese officials, that China’s “cyberwarfare doctrine” is a way to balance America’s superior conventional capabilities.

Jon R Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S Reveron have compiled a timely volume of academic papers detailing, in their words, how China both generates and copes with Internet insecurity through close attention to its domestic institutions and processes.

This multifaceted book discusses the doctrines, motives, purposes, and capabilities of Chinese activities in cyberspace, internal and external. The chapters authored by Chinese writers, including one current member of the People’s Liberation Army, are especially illuminating. Particularly striking are their attempts to create new terms to describe this new sphere of geopolitical activity, and their overall optimism over the possibility of international management of cyberspace.

The inclusion of the Chinese authors is not just even-handed but necessary, for this is primarily a book about China. The American writers largely view the United States as a victim of Chinese cyberespionage, neglecting in large part the other prominent entity: the U.S. National Security Agency. American cyber-activity is discussed mostly in passing by the book’s American authors, though the Chinese authors as well as the editors ensure that the contradictions inherent in American protestations are mentioned.

The official position of the United States, according to Professor Fred Cate, one of the volume’s concluding authors, is that it only conducts cyber operations against government for military and other commercial information, while the Chinese are hacking businesses for trade secrets and commercial information.

The strange corollary to this argument [is] that commercial secrets are somehow more valuable than military information. It also creates a distinction between the private and public spheres that that is increasingly blurry given how often corporate success is seen as a part of national interest. Nor, finally, does this distinction have any basis in fact. Edward Snowden’s revelations have revealed that the NSA has targeted Huawei, Hong Kong-based universities, and foreign trade delegations.

This has made the American argument, continues Cate, “a tough sell.” He quotes a former Department of Defense official as saying

… the Huawei revelations are devastating rebuttals to hypocritical U.S. complaints about penetration of U.S. networks, and also make USG protestations about not stealing intellectual property to help U.S. firms’ competitiveness seem like the self-splitting hairsplitting that it is.

Philosophy aside, the practical difficulty in controlling cyberespionage, as shown by both American and Chinese activity, is that it very hard to sanction. Both traditional and cyberespionage break the target country’s laws, but only the former requires (in most cases) someone to be physically inside a country’s territory and thereby subject to apprehension. Even if law enforcement could identify precisely who instigated a hack, actual arrests are rarely possible. Thus, domestic sanctions are largely meaningless.

This is of course a function of the Internet itself, which allows action at distance, and is not a characteristic of cyberespionage per se. American websites pushing information through the Great Firewall may in practice be in violation of local Chinese censorship laws, yet China can do little but block access to those websites. This issue also occurs between allies: France’s data-privacy watchdog has told Google and other Internet firms that, in order to execute Europe’s “right to be forgotten,” they need to scrub offending links from all their websites, and not just their European versions. Of course, without erecting a China-style firewall, there is little France can practically do.

The editors’ conclude that

… the United States and China, or any other advanced industrial countries [sic] for that matter, will not be able to separate cybersecurity from their diplomatic relations.

Cyberespionage, furthermore

is simply too essential a tool for China’s economic development and political stability strategy and for the national security strategy of the United States

for either country to expect the other to limit its activity.

Cyberespionage and its variants therefore become an important avenue for inter-state competition, though its extent, threat and usefulness remain subject to actual international conditions.

The editors provide a useful two-by-two matrix in their final chapter that best illustrates the possible outcomes. One dimension asks whether the international environment is collaborative or combative; the second asks whether the threats posed by cyberspace are limited or severe. A collaborative environment is more able to manage the threats posed by cyberspace; severe threats would lead to the development of new norms and rules governing cyberspace. However, a competitive environment leads to different outcomes: mild threats leads to “contested cyberspace”, while severe threats leads to cyberwarfare.

The question thus becomes whether the international environment is collaborative or competitive, and whether threats are mild or severe. These determinations are clearly easier listed than evaluated, and they require a knowledge of local institutions in both the United States and China, the possibility of cooperation, and whether either side feels the other’s cyberactivities represent an “existential threat”.

There are a few hopeful indications that things may not be as bad as pessimists believe. First, despite the “cloak-and-daggers” vibe in many general discussions around cyberespionage, the researchers have drawn intelligent and well-thought out conclusions using publicly-available data: the chapter detailing the locations of China’s information-warfare groups and the state-owned companies they are attached to was compiled using publicly-accessible websites.

There is also room for cooperation between China and the United States, or at least an understanding of what is broadly unacceptable. Cate argues that a focus on China is ill-advised, as it

contributes to US policymakers losing sight of the broad range of cyberthreats and their many sources, which include, but certainly are not limited to, China.

If cybersecurity really presents such broad threats, it may be that Washington and Beijing can agree on some solutions. Both countries have promised not to target “critical infrastructure” (however that is defined) during peacetime, and have pledged to pursue cybercrime more vigilantly within their own territories. In addition, as China develops further, it may reach a point where allowing unchecked cyberespionage presents more costs than benefits, pushing Beijing to support more international management. It remains to be seen how these agreements develop, yet while it seems that the odds are that cybersecurity will become a significant source of tension between Beijing and Washington, the editors note (with some surprise) that Chinese authors are much more optimistic that cyberspace can be managed than are the American authors.

The editors’ framework is helpful for evaluating the probability of each outcome. If the international environment is cooperative, the results will be largely benign; if anything, more severe threats will make an international solution more likely. In contrast, a more competitive environment makes the danger posed by cyberspace becomes far more important, making the difference between a contested, but ultimately peaceful, cyberspace (akin, perhaps, to Cold War mistrust) and outright “cyberwarfare.”

Cyberspace is both new and complicated, even lacking in many instances the questions to be asked when analyzing the issue. China and Cybersecurity is a step towards providing them. Are threats perceived to be existential, or merely troublesome? How conducive are both countries to international management? Are countries able to close themselves off from the global Internet without suffering disproportionate consequences, as China has partially done? With these in mind, one can begin to evaluate whether these new activities is really as threatening as the pessimists believe, or whether it remains a significant, but not dangerous, nuisance.

#### 5. CFIUS fails – their uniqueness evidence says that attacks are happening now – that proves that CFIUS is ineffective or the Chinese will spy through other methods

#### 6. China won’t challenge US leadership – lacks hegemonic ambition and technological capability – interdependence ensures co-operation

Chen 15 – (Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. He is also the Founding Director of Intellisia Institute, a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China. His research interests include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights; 6/14/15, “Relax, China Won't Challenge US Hegemony,” *The Diplomat*, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/relax-china-wont-challenge-us-hegemony>, Accessed 6/27/16, HWilson)

Needless to say, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important yet complicated bilateral relationships in the world today. This explains why Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang’s recent comments on Sino-U.S. relations have stirred up a debate online (here and here). Wang Yang stated that China “[has] neither the ability nor the intent to challenge the United States.” Partly because it is rare for a senior Chinese leader to make such soft remarks with regard to Sino-U.S. relations and partly because Wang’s remarks are seemingly inconsistent with China’s recent assertive foreign policies, there has been a fierce debate about the true meaning of Wang’s remarks in the United States. Most American analysts, however, are skeptical toward Wang’s conciliatory remarks and continue to believe that China’s ultimate aim is to establish a China-centric order in Asia at the expense of the U.S. influence in Asia. In other words, China seeks to replace the U.S. as the new global hegemon.

The reactions from the U.S. side, again, reveal the deep mistrust with regard to China’s long term goals. But such skepticism is misguided and even dangerous to Asia’s peace and stability if left uncorrected. Why? Because Wang Yang was sincere when he said that China does not have the capabilities and desires to challenge the United States. The evidence of his sincerity is apparent.

First let us look at China’s capabilities, which need to be especially formidable if China wants to challenge the United States. Although China’s comprehensive capabilities have been growing rapidly for the past three decades, almost all analysts inside and outside of China agree that there is still a huge gap between China and the U.S. in terms of comprehensive capabilities, particularly when the U.S. is far ahead of China in military and technological realms. China’s economy might have already passed the U.S. economy as the largest one in 2014, but the quality of China’s economy still remains a major weakness for Beijing. Thus, it would be a serious mistake for China to challenge the U.S. directly given the wide gap of capabilities between the two. Even if one day China’s comprehensive capabilities catch up with the United States, it would still be a huge mistake for China to challenge the U.S. because by then the two economies would be much more closely interconnected, creating a situation of mutual dependence benefiting both countries.

Besides limited capabilities, China also has limited ambitions which have not been properly understood by many U.S. analysts. It is true that China’s grand strategy is to realize the “China dream” — a dream that will bring wealth, glory, and power to China again — but this, by no means, suggests that China wants to become a hegemon in Asia, or to create a Sino-centric tributary system around which all smaller states must obey China’s orders. Perhaps these perceptions exist in the United States because many U.S. analysts have unconsciously let ultra-realist thinking slip into their minds, thereby believing that states are constantly engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power and influence. But the structure of international politics has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War, thus rendering any serious possibility of world hegemony ineffective or even impossible. In essence, the costs of hegemony outweigh the benefits of hegemony in this new era of international politics, thanks to rising nationalism, nuclear weapons, and increasing economic interdependence between major powers. The Chinese leaders understand this new and changed structure of international politics and based on their assessments, they have decided not to seek hegemony, which is a losing business in this new era.

Unfortunately, the U.S. is still obsessed with the concept (or illusion) of hegemony, as Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow have pointed out recently. The hegemony mentality is precisely the reason why the United States has declined (slowly) in the post-Cold War era. Wrongly believing that a stable global order needs U.S. hegemony, American leaders have adopted a grand strategy of liberal interventionism, which has only caused self-inflicted wounds for the U.S. economy and its global status. The tragedy, however, is that within U.S. elite circles, this misperception about U.S. hegemony (here and here) sticks and is unlikely to go away for a long time barring a major failure or crisis.

At the end of the day, our world can survive and prosper without a hegemon, regardless of whether the hegemon is American or Chinese. The sooner American leaders understand this point and believe Chinese leaders’ words, the higher the chances of peace and stability worldwide.

#### 7. Espionage inevitable — mergers and acquisitions aren’t key — China will still hack and spy on American companies.